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REVIEWS.

Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society. By LESTER F. WARD. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1903.

FROM the psychological point of view, this book is more instructive in what it attempts but fails to do than in what it actually accomplishes. This remark, however, is not intended as a wholly unsympathetic criticism, for many writers on sociology escape this failure only because they are not bold enough to make the attempt. The author's avowed aim is to ground sociology in psychology. If he falls short of attaining this end, it is because of the character of the psychological conceptions which he employs. His failure is therefore instructive as pointing the way to sounder psychological principles as a basis for this sociological superstructure.

Throughout the book psychological terms and distinctions form crucial points in the course of the argument. The exact meaning of such terms as "feeling," "sensation," "conation," "interest," "will," "subjective and objective faculties," "intuition," "perception," "reason," etc., is thus very important. But it is just here, in spite of the display of considerable solicitude on the part of the author to define his terms with precision, that there is to be found a vagueness and haziness, not to say inconsistency, in his use of terms, which betrays the diverse sources from which these psychological conceptions have been derived. Many of these conceptions, of course, are true, but they are not consistently developed. The psychological doctrines do not form a coherent view taken by themselves, and notably fail to articulate in any organic way with the biological and the sociological parts of the system.

According to Mr. Ward, achievement, or social activities as embodied in institutions, constitutes the fundamental subject-matter of sociology. "It does not really study men or the human race at all. That belongs to other sciences than sociology, chiefly to anthropology. It studies the activities, results, products, in a word, achievement" (p. 38). "The social forces are . . . psychic, and hence sociology must have a psychological basis" (p. 101). "Human events are

phenomena of the same general character as other natural phenomena, only more complex and difficult to study on account of the subtle psychic causes that so largely produce them" (p. 57). Social action is the result of psychic as well as of physical and social forces and conditions, and the same principle is extended to sociology which has so long been held in natural science and is beginning to be applied to psychology—that only where there is necessity and law can there be science. "All social phenomena are the results of laws" (p. 59). And the fundamental law of natural science is the fundamental law of social phenomena also: the law of action along the line of least resistance.

It is out of such a conception of the social forces that the problem of social mechanics arises, which deals with the dynamic agent (whose action is genetic), carefully to be distinguished from the directive agent (whose action is telic). Into the discussion of social statics and social dynamics we may not enter here. The important point for which the whole discussion stands, in relation to what follows in this review, is that in social mechanics we are dealing with forces which "can be depended upon to produce effects with the same certainty and exactness as do physical forces" (p. 145). This must be borne in mind when the author goes on to state that feeling is the primary social force.

"The dynamic agent," he says, "consists wholly in feeling" (p. 256). "Feeling is a true cosmic force . . . and constitutes the propelling agent in animals and man" (p. 99). "In the associated state of man it is the social force" (p. 99). It is the "propelling force of society comparable to the wind that fills the sails or the steam-power that turns the screw of a vessel at sea" (p. 462). "The thinking faculty is not a force. But feeling is a true force and its various manifestations constitute the social forces" (p. 101).

Now, it is evident from such passages that "feeling" is used in a sense different from that current today in psychology. Yet in other respects feeling is treated as though it were in the same category with other mental processes. This conception of feeling as an efficient cause is justified by the principle of "creative synthesis" in accordance with which new forces or principles of action appear upon the scene from time to time in the progress of evolution. This evolution is sympodial in its progress, and the co-operation of physical and psychical and social forces in this process the author calls "synergy." Under cover of such magical phrases, he is able to say "that spiritual

phenomena are as much natural phenomena as physical phenomena, that spiritual forces are true natural forces, and that there is a spiritual energy, *i. e.*, a psychic and social energy, that is as capable of doing work as any other form of kinetic energy. In fact, it is the highest and most effective form of energy or *vis viva*" (p. 167).

Now, this may be true, but it certainly is a use of the terms "spiritual" and "energy" for which the logic of modern science has not prepared us. For the average scientist today the psychic and the social, in so far as they are natural phenomena, admit of explanation only in terms of the laws of natural science. It may be that those laws are false or inadequate, but until this is demonstrated he is justified in looking askance at this "spiritual energy" that is "capable of doing work," at this *vis viva* which claims to be the crowning instance of the manifestation of natural forces. To be sure, one has a perfect right to call the naturalistic treatment of social phenomena "social mechanics" or "social physics," but the natural scientist feels that the laws are no more (and no less) "spiritual" when he is treating instances of the relations of these forces among social objects than among so-called material objects. It may be that feeling is a force, but to call it such in the present condition of science is to state a problem, not to solve one.

Turning to his conception of consciousness, we find the same sort of ambiguity and vagueness. He says, indeed, that "there is no need of descanting on the 'mystery of mind.' It is no more mysterious than other things." "At best, mind was only an accident, an epiphenomenon" (p. 128). But when we come to look into his exposition of the subject, somehow the sense of mystery grows upon us in spite of his assurances. According to the author, "chemism grows out of ethereal vibrations." "Life emerges in some way from chemism through the differential attribute of protoplasm, motility." "Feeling sprang from life." "Feeling created intellect." Achievement "is only possible in a rational being" (p. 97). "Mind is of biologic origin." "Feeling was a new power that was called in to supplement the original forces of matter and life" (p. 132). "Feeling . . . was the only conceivable means by which plastic organisms could be preserved from destruction and enabled to perpetuate themselves and develop" (p. 125). "Inorganic matter was converted into living forms," and "quantities of physical and vital energy were converted into psychic energy" (p. 141). "Passing to the organic world we find new forces . . . the vital and psychic . . . and we have corre-

sponding changes in the character of the products" (p. 174). "All forces are essentially alike, and the life force or growth force is like any other physical force. That is, it always obeys the first law of motion and causes motion in a straight line unless deflected by another force" (p. 178). "Science . . . teaches the spirituality of matter" (p. 379). "The deeper we penetrate the secrets of nature, the less do the mechanical, material, and physical processes seem to differ from psychic and spiritual processes, and all will ultimately prove to be the same" (p. 454).

Now, what intelligible notion can be gotten from these conflicting statements? The spiritual (psychical and social) forces are all primarily physical in their nature, like physical forces obeying the laws of motion, yet they are new forces called in to supplement the original forces of matter and life. The mere phrase "creative synthesis" does not clear up contradictions such as these. He says that these forces will all ultimately prove to be the same, but he offers no hypothesis which might make this statement intelligible. The difficulty of the apparent contradiction of the law of conservation of energy he passes over with the remark that "the conservation of energy and correlation of forces are as applicable to psychic and social forces as to physical forces" (p. 99).

Let us turn to another psychological conception. He says that feeling is prior to cognition. "The feelings had, moreover, a much earlier origin than the intellect, so that during a prolonged period they constituted the only psychic manifestations, and do so still throughout practically the entire animal world" (p. 101). A psychologist, reading this, naturally wonders whether this statement means what, upon the surface, it appears to mean. If feeling is a dynamic force, and intellect is not a force, but only a telic or directive agent, one might raise the question whether the question of priority could have any significance at all in the case of two such wholly different things. If both could be brought into the same category, either as forces or as telic agents, then the question of priority might be intelligible, and has, of course, often been raised and discussed by psychologists.

Feeling, he says, is "the subjective department of mind, the phenomena being wholly subjective or relating to the organism, and never objective or relating to the external world" (p. 102). It is "subjective subjectivity" (p. 128). How this can be reconciled with the statement that feeling is a physical force he does not explain. "One of its inherent qualities," he says, "is that of seeking an end" (p. 102). It

is conative, appetitive, and "appetition is a motive and impels to action" (p. 102). Now, if feeling acts as a motive, it would seem as though there must be intellect there. If there is no cognitive side to it, it can be only motor, propulsive. He meets this by saying that "motive" here means mobile, not *motif*. He insists that the psychic (feeling) can *be* without being recognized as such (intellect). But is not this *being recognized as such* the very essence of the psychic? If there is no consciousness of the process, how does this "motive" differ from any other movement—from a tropism, for example?

Again, he says, "action is certain to follow the motive, unless prevented by some physical obstacle or by other motives that antagonize it and produce a state of psychic equilibrium." But such antagonism of motives leading to psychic equilibrium is the very essence of what we mean by the cognitive—the tension of means and ends, of motives. He says that feeling takes the form of appetite and desire. "It not only consists of an awareness of self, but of an awareness of some need" (p. 102). Now, what is this but cognition? In so far as this is not simply a consciousness of need or lack in general (a form which consciousness never takes in the lower forms at least), it is consciousness of some specific need, and this specification is cognitive.

The fallacy of making feeling prior in the evolution of consciousness has been exposed so often in psychological controversy that one hesitates to devote much space to a new example of the error. But consider one more instance. On a later page he says: "Although feeling is a conscious state, still there is no consciousness, at least in the lower stages of development, of the relation of feeling to function. The conscious creature is conscious only of its own states. It is not conscious of the functional effect of its actions in response to those states" (p. 126). "It subserves function but not for the sake of function" (p. 128). Here we have the *reductio ad absurdum* of this notion. Of what "states" could any creature be conscious if not states of the "relation of feeling to function"? That is all any consciousness consists of—feelings, sensations, and these in relation to "its actions in response." If feeling came into existence as a means to the performance of function, as the author insists, then that means must have been means to some end: a means apart from an end to which it is a means is not truly a means. There must have been some "foresight," however vague, if there was any feeling whatever, for otherwise there would be no significance in the appearance of the feeling. Bare or mere or pure feeling is an abstraction of the psychologist.

The difficulties grow only greater when we come to his statements concerning the relation of feeling to thought. While feeling remains a force, thought, which, according to his own theory, is evolved from feeling, is pronounced to be, not a force, but a relation. "There is no transition possible from feeling to thought. . . . The distinction is generic, and there are no intermediate stages or gradations from the one to the other. . . . They are phenomena of entirely different orders and do not admit of comparison . . . since while one is in a sense measurable, being a force, the other is wholly incommensurable, being a relation" (p. 457). What has become of our scientific principle of continuity? And what sort of a psychology is it that evolves relations out of forces, the incommensurable out of the measurable!

We find the same confusion and contradiction in his conception of the relation of structure and function. "The function is the end for which a mechanism is constructed" (p. 180). "The structures are only the means. Function is the end" (p. 181). This is pre-eminently true, but we then are startled with the statement that function is static because structure is static. "All considerations of structure being static, it is evident that all considerations of function must also be statical" (p. 181). "Function, simply as such, has no effect whatever in modifying structure" (p. 181). Biologists today, I suppose, will grant that function does not modify structure; it is not a *vera causa*. But, on the other hand, will they not say that function *is structure undergoing modification*? A really static structure is a mechanism, not an organism, or, at least, it is an inert (relatively speaking) mechanism, not an operating mechanism.

He says that "the process by which structures are produced is not a dynamic process" (p. 222). "Dynamic movements are confined to structures already formed and, as stated, consist in changes in the type of these structures." At what point can it be said that structures are "already formed"? All functioning is change of structure, and it is impossible to draw a line and say where this becomes a change in the "type" of structure. He himself asserts that this change of type "takes place by infinitesimal increments" (p. 222), and he calls attention to the fact that "in biology it has now been learned that species are not fixed but variable, and that there has been a perpetual transmutation of species" (p. 224). How, then, can he speak of any living structure as static? This is the characteristic of all life, of all growth. Without recognizing it, he has himself supplied the key to his own difficulty when he says, in another place, that the science of social

statics "assumes the fixity of human institutions in order to study them, abstracts for the moment the idea of movement or change, and deals with society at a given point of time. It takes, as it were, an instantaneous photograph" (p. 224). How, then, can he make such statements as have been quoted above, if this static character is a mere methodological abstraction and not the real fact concerning the phenomena? If social statics represents this abstraction, then social statics should rest on social dynamics, and not the reverse, as he contends. An application of this point of view would save him also from the very great difficulties which he unnecessarily creates for himself by his arbitrary separation of biological function, individual feeling, and social action (or achievement). It would prevent his artificial separation of means and ends, of dynamic force and directive agent. What he calls *telesis* must have been present from the first in what he calls *genesis*.

Finally, we come to what is in some respects the most important psychological conception in the book, because of its relations to sociology—that of the place of the psychical individual in social achievement. The fundamental law is that in organic evolution the environment transforms the organism, whereas in the socialization of achievement man transforms the environment (p. 254). The medium of this transformation is mind, consciousness, reason, the psychic. The instrument of progress is strictly individualistic (p. 545). "Social genesis is secured through individual *telesis*" (p. 545). "The initiative is almost exclusively individual and the ends sought are egocentric. The social consequences are . . . unconscious." The really social nature of individual consciousness and the important function of the individual in the reconstruction of (social) experience are vaguely assumed throughout the book. This is perhaps the most important question at the present time in both psychology and sociology—the relation between the social process of evolution as a whole and the psychic process which takes place in the individual consciousness. In certain passages this function of the individual in the reorganization of social experience is worked out in a very suggestive way. Yet here, too, an inadequate psychology precludes any satisfactory statement of the principle.

"The phenomenon is psychic" (p. 243). This is the peculiar function of the "directive agent," of "*telesis*." An example is found in the inventive genius. "What the inventor does is to discover the principle. . . . This discovery, and not the resulting material product, is the lasting element in the operation" (p. 29). The author

would even have a technique of invention and discovery. He deplores the fact that there is "no recognition of invention as a discipline" and "no text-book . . . on invention in general" (p. 495).

The biological homologue is the "sport" (p. 240). His own term is "social innovation," which he prefers to "invention" (Tarde), "impulse" (Patten), "instinct of workmanship" (Veblen), etc. He enumerates the following sources of innovation:

In the first place, he mentions caste, slavery, and other sources of inequalities among men giving rise to a leisure class as an important instance of the principle of innovation. The conquering race became the leisure class. Other influences, especially the sacerdotal, contributed to the same end. Individuals of this leisure class became responsible to a great extent for social innovations. The author curiously traces this impulse to the attempt to escape ennui.

Moreover, with the beginning of settled community life and the individual, instead of the communal, possession of property, the individual tends more and more to be the medium of social progress. Only relatively late in social evolution can the individual be said to have become the instrument of social advance, and it is not wholly true now. The social forces are still predominantly unconscious and generic rather than reflective and individual. But the rise of reflective thought, the bringing to consciousness of the method or technique of social action, which, of course, could only take place in the consciousness of individuals, *i. e.*, only in the psychical sphere, has brought the psychic individual into the foreground as the chief instrumentality from now on through which social achievement will be won.

The spheres of romantic and conjugal love are ranked high in the scale of social innovations, as also the so-called anti-social emotions of jealousy and revenge.

The spiritual forces are the only positively socializing forces because they alone are egoistic, psychic; they alone are truly socio-genetic.

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Le problème du déterminisme social: Déterminisme biologique et déterminisme social. By D. DRAGHICESCO, membre de la Société de Sociologie. Paris: Éditions de la Grande France, 1903. Pp. 99. Fr. 2.50.

RECOGNIZING the necessity of a demonstrated theory of social determinism as the basis of social science, the author of this book